Free Trade Agreement Shows Washington Misunderstands the Rise of China
In mid-November, 15 Asia-Pacific countries, representing a third of global economic output, announced the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The deal will move the region towards the reduction of tariffs and a more unified trading system. This agreement is not only significant economically, but will have geopolitical reverberations.
Importantly, it disproves many of the myths the American public has been told about China. Rather than its rise being seen as a threat to freedom and democracy that must be confronted in the Asia-Pacific, Chinese growth is largely considered an opportunity for mutual gains among the states involved. This makes the possibility of an American alliance to balance against or thwart the rise of China highly unlikely.
Antony Blinken, a top Biden foreign policy adviser, calls for “a league of democracies or a democratic cooperative network” to counter Beijing. In this, he sounds like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who warns that the rise of China has implications “for our economy, for our liberty, and indeed for the future of free democracies,” arguing “the challenge of China demands exertion, energy from democracies…especially those in the Indo-Pacific region.”
If China truly threatened the future of freedom, why are democracies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea deepening their ties with Beijing? China is already the main trading partner of all three of these nations, and each is seeking further integration.
China has a GDP that is about equal to that of the other 14 nations of the RCEP combined. Closer trade relations under a unified system further cements China’s status as the economic and geopolitical center of the Asia-Pacific. Greater integration potentially gives Beijing more leverage over its trading partners, a prospect they do not seem particularly bothered by. Are we to believe that Washington understands the interests of the 14 nations involved better than they themselves do?
In addition to the myth that China threatens its neighbors, another falsehood disproved by the RCEP is the idea that American influence depends on military commitments abroad. By any measure, the Trump administration doubled down on the U.S. policy of being militarily involved in the Far East, including conducting more “freedom of navigation operations” through disputed waters in the South China Sea in 2019 than in any previous year, and going farther than any recent administration in embracing the U.S. role as a supporter of Taiwanese independence.
The lack of connection between military commitments and the ability to influence events on the ground can be seen most clearly in South Korea. The U.S. has 30,000 troops in that country. Yet on a wide range of issues, including its refusal to take a position on Hong Kong and willingness to let in Huawei as a 5G provider, South Korea takes the side of Beijing over Washington. It is little wonder why, as South Korea conducts twice as much trade with China as it does with the U.S. This is because economics and geopolitical realities, not the structure of military alliances or the nature of commitments, is the ultimate source of power in international politics today.
To understand the rise of China and its implications, it is better to trust the behavior of those most directly affected than politicians and pundits in Washington. The former have chosen to accommodate and integrate with, rather than balance against, Beijing, and perceive relatively little economic and military threat. Many in the American establishment, however, have come to see China as mostly a challenge, if not a threat to human freedom across the globe.
Both of these views cannot be correct. While part of these differences may be due to the U.S. perceiving a realistic threat to its own power and influence, American grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific depends on working with partners and allies that feel similarly threatened. If they do not, and would rather trade with China and work out disputes peacefully than check its rise, then there is little basis on which the U.S. can form a “balancing coalition” or “alliance of democracies” to preserve American power and influence at the expense of Beijing.
The RCEP shows that Washington is isolated in how it sees the rise of China. Countries generally do not build stronger trade relations with nations that pose an existential threat. China may well threaten American influence abroad, yet will continue to be seen as more of a partner than adversary by the nations that the U.S. needs as allies in order to have any hope of balancing against it.
For reasons of geography, economics and national self-interest, China is destined to be the most powerful nation in its part of the world. The U.S. strategy of trying to preserve its influence through a doubling down on military commitments and a move towards some kind of “economic decoupling” will not change this fundamental fact. All it does is create a risk of conflict, and potentially lead to catastrophic trade wars. The path for the U.S. is clear if it seeks to pursue policies that take into consideration the perspectives of other nations and are realistic about what can be accomplished abroad.
If the countries of the Asia-Pacific can live with a rising China as a regional hegemon, there is no reason that the United States cannot as well. In the end, it won’t have a choice.
